Wednesday, May 31, 2006

Religious Language: Myth, Language Games and Stuff I Forgot

Still More Religious Language

Religious Language as Myth

  • A myth is a story told using symbol, metaphor, analogy and parable to convey some kind of religious truth. The story, in itself, tells us nothing if taken literally, but through it we gain something considered a deeper truth, or a more in depth meaning.
  • A lot of Christians resign themselves to the fact that a lot of stories in the Old Testament (if not all of the Bible) are myths and allegories.
  • A lot of contemporary philosophers dislike the use of mythology in conveying ideas beyond our own, as they often contain outmoded ideas; for example the Genesis story appears anachronistic compared to the theory of the Big Bang. Rudolph Buttman says that to gain any truth from the New Testament we must cast asunder the use of mythological language, but does not say why!
    • This view is opposed however, as other theologians believe that to ignore the use of myth in the bible would render most (if not all of the bible) as useless and nothing can be gained from it.
  • A myth hoping to explain the birth of the universe is called a “cosmogony”.
    • These cosmogonies all share apparent common themes. Note the use of the word “apparent”, in the fact that these are the thoughts of modern scholars being projected onto the work, and not stepping stones put in place by the writers of the stories. Anyway, here are those building blocks:
      • A prior chaotic, or formless, state, either described as “a body of water, or nothing at all”.
      • A god who exists in the void in order to perform an action which causes creation.
      • In latter stages: the introduction of human beings.
      • A connector between the world of the God in question and the world of the men He creates, which also puts us in our place in the scheme of things.
    • This provides aetiological mythical grounding for religions; that is to say “a foundation myth”.

Purpose

  • Some scholars believe religious language has a purpose in conveying ideas, which makes it meaningful.
  • R.B. Braithwaite for example tells us that Verification and Falsification are useless when talking about religion, as they can only be used in dealing with cognitive language (to verify: cognitive language is that which deals with our worldly experience), whereas religious language is completely non-cognitive.
  • Religious language is a moral discourse”, apparently, because it almost entirely tells us how we should act toward one another.
    • Theological propositions are not explanations of facts in the world of nature in the way in which established scientific hypotheses are.
  • Braithwaite argues that religious claims have meaning because:
    • A religious claim is, at first, a moral one, and one which expresses a certain view. It illustrates the intention and wish to conform to certain ways of behaving.
    • It is different from a purely moral claim, however, as it will refer to some kind of parable or allegory, rather than just being an intention.
    • It is not entirely needed for a person to believe the truth of the story in order to live by its doctrine.

More Symbology

  • J.R. Randall seems to side himself with Tillich and sees religious language as “huan activity, which makes a special contribution to human culture.” It acts to agitate people, to stir them up and unify them through their common faith.
  • They serve a few functions too:
    • They aim to point out the idea they are trying to get across.
    • They “participate” in the overall meaning of the concept.

Jung

  • In his work “Man and his Symbols”, Jung informs us of 4 base “archetypes” which resolve themselves as we examine the subconscious.
  • He attempts to show that various symbols are common among religions and that, in this, we never stray far from our “animal psyche”. He believes these archetypes reveal themselves in the symbols of art and religion.
  • Aniela Jaff hopes to show in the evolution of the symbol of the cross that religion evolved. The original Greek cross looks just like a “+”, symbol; however, over time the modern cross has a slightly raised point of crossing, which is claimed to symbolise the alteration of the centre of man from the earth to that of a “higher”, spiritual plane.

Language Games

  • Ludwig Wittgenstein rejected the verification principle and decided that the meaning of words and statements is in their use, the “function they perform as agreed by the particular group or society using them
  • Wittgenstein tells us that every activity has its own associated language, and considered it as a “game”.
  • These games exist within all forms of humanity.
    • People outside of a game will not understand the language used in it, as they do not know the rules that the game is played by.
    • As they do not understand the rules, the language appears meaningless.
    • Religious language has its own “rules”, understood by those who believe, and that a non-believer could never really hope to understand, and is thus meaningless to the unbeliever.
    • He says, in finishing, that just because we do not understand the meaning of the language used, does not mean that the language used has no meaning.
  • Wittgenstein says that we cannot create a personal language, because how would we know that we are using the language correctly without some kind of group concurrence?
  • As a result of this, Wittgenstein denies “first-person certainty”, that idea which underlines rationalists and empiricists.
  • However, it is considered by other contemporaries that religious believers are involved in other language games because they are involved in other aspects of life. If one were to enter a similar aspect of life then surely the common grounds allow for a discussion and perhaps understanding and thus the decision if the ideas have meaning for them.

It could also turn out that non-believers may have a better understanding of religious language than believers, as they approach it with a certain amount of (debatable) objectivity, rather than preferential bias.

Tuesday, May 30, 2006

Religious Language: Analogy and Symbol

More Religious Language

Analogy

  • Aquinas was the first to consider the idea that language can be used analogously to talk about God.
    • He felt the only language we could use to talk about God was the language that we use every day, as that, really, is the only language we have. When we apply these meanings to God, however, we understand that God is perfect, so the words do not apply wholely, and therefore are analogous.
    • A fair few philosophers do not like this, as, when talking in analogy, it is argued that you need a sort of common ground and understanding about the subject you’re talking about. God, however, is so far beyond human understanding that we cannot share any common ground on him, realistically.
    • Aquinas replied with the idea that there is common grounds for using analogy in the fact that God has a relationship with the world and us, in that he made it and sustains it, and there is thus some kind of comparable point.
    • He decided there are two forms of analogy to talk about God:
      • Analogy of Proportion is where analogy is used to talk about the quality that something has in reference to some sort of reference point. We say that God is “all powerful” in relation to human power, in the same way that humans possess loyalty, but in a different way in which dogs possess it.
      • Analogy of Attribution is where we talk about a quality that something has which is referenced to a previous quality which causes the quality we’re talking about at the start (…wah?). The example given is that if we say that someone looks “sickly” then it may be because his appearance is analogous to the appearance of someone who is ill.
  • Ian Ramsey talks about “models” and “qualifiers”! To say that “God is Good” is a “model” of what God is (it might be nice to think of it as a scale model of a plane: it is obviously not quite the same as the plane it is modelled after [in size at least], but it is analogous to the full sized plane). In order to “qualify” the statement for God, we must add a sample of the real scale of it in terms of God. It is more accurate and proper to say that “God is infinitely good.”

Symbol


 

  • Paul Tillich thought symbol was the way forward! He did not like the idea that religious language tries to “interpret” a religious experience, and called it “closer to poetry than prose” as a result of it.
  • He argued for symbols as he claimed they “open up” new levels of reality, and “go beyond the external world” to their “internal reality”. Sounds batty. He felt they “unlock dimensions and elements of our soul”. Nutter.
  • He says, to add, that symbols are not timeless, but alter through time and through various interpretation.
  • Paul Edwards argues that symbols don’t convey factual knowledge!
  • The symbols used, as a whole, are not adequate or appropriate! It is not possible for religious symbols to point beyond human experience, which makes good logical sense! There is, as a result, no way of seeing if the symbol gives the wrong impressions about those which are beyond our understanding.

Symbols, it is claimed, show us things about the real world. Because these symbols are not being applied to an objective reality there is no way of having two people say the same thing about them.


 

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In other news: NOTHING EVER HAPPENS.

Sunday, May 28, 2006

Religious Language: Verification and Falsification

Religious Language


  • If you cannot remember that via negative (or Apophatic Way), then you will lose. Don’t even answer this question if you cannot remember something so simple. The marker will probably wee on your paper in contempt if you don’t bother.
    • This is a way of describing something transcendental and ineffable (mainly God) in light of it’s negative traits, like saying “God is not evil” or whatever.
    • This was originally written about by Moses Maimonides a LONG time ago.
    • It was also picked up on by Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite
      • He likes the via negative over the via positiva (which was apparent for millennia before.
      • The key point in his work is that God is above and beyond every faculty of human conception.
      • There are three separate stages of thought about god:
        • The first is the via negative!
        • The second is the state of affirmation. In saying what we do not know of God and establishing him on non-personal terms, we can say what we know of God and this can be said affirmatively, albeit inadequately, as we are still human.
        • The third state is to convey God is beyond human understanding simply by saying that he is “beyond”.
        • So, a worked example: we can say, via negative, that God is not bad, so God must be good, but as human language is inadequate: God is beyond goodness.
        • Dionysius takes his qualifiers for God from the bible.
    • Hick points out that in taking affirmations from the bible, Dionysius robs God of his ineffableness, as what he is is already mapped out.


Verification Principle


  • Developed by logical positivists of the Vienna Circle. They felt that only statements with the ability to be empirically verified have any meaning. This is an interesting definition, as it does not say “are true”, but simply “can be proven”.
  • One popular way of quoting this idea is that “a statement has meaning if we know under what circumstances it is true or false.”
  • “The meaning of a proposition is the method of verification”
  • They only liked two real kinds of statement (which most can be divided into):
    • Analytical (a priori) are those which have an inherent logical correctness (thing pertaining to common sense! My father fathered me, for example!)
    • Synthetic (a posteriori) where things are externally verifiably by experience or experiment.
    • In effect, this principle states:
      • “we know the meaning of a statement if we know the conditions under which the statement is true or false”
    • As a result of all this talk, it was decided by these fellows that religious talk is meaningless, as it can never be scientifically verified!
    • Some people hold it does have meaning as it serves a different function from bog-standard human talk and in the context of the transcendental realms of the divine it has meaning.


  • One of the big problems with religious language is that it attempts to convey concepts well beyond the scope of the words used as well as the understanding of human nature. So, AJ Ayer says:


A.J. Ayer


  • He was a dawg gone logical positivist, so he subscribed to the ideas of empiricism.
  • He tells us that scientific ideas may not be verifiable “in practice”, but because scientists understand how to verify what they say, they are verifiable “in principle”.
  • If we know how to prove a statement true or false then we know it has meaning, and without this it is meaningless. Religious statements cannot be “empirically analysed”, and are thus are meaningless, having no grounds for being proved or disproved.
  • He states later, however, that there are some scientific and historical “facts” that we cannot verify with much certainty, and thus introduced the strong and weak verification principle.
    • The Strong Verification principle when there is no doubt as to whether a statement is true or false, as it is directly observable.
    • The Weak Verification principle is one which allows us to accept that past and future statements have some amount of ascribed truth, as, in the past, people could have observed things as being directly true if they were there. For example, I was not alive when man landed on the moon, but it is (debatably) verified as there were people who went to the moon and landed on it who would attest to the fact that it happened.
      • John Hick argues that God could be proven using the weak verification principle, as there is a small chance that, in the future, his existence could be witnessed, as on your death bed. He calls this Eschatological Verifcation.
  • To quote:

A proposition is.. verifiable in the strong sense of the term if, and only if, its truth could be conclusively established… But it is verifiable in the weak sense if it is possible for experience to render it probable.”


A.J. Ayer


  • He accepts a priori mathematical proofs and linguistic ones as verifiable as it would be daft to think otherwise. He says this is because it would not only be illogical on the grounds of logic to reject them, but also because accepting them “adds nothing to our knowledge”. He gives an example of this by saying that a being with complete logical sense would not have to have anything about the definitions or routes of his statements explained, as he happens upon them logically.


Problems


  • The Verification principle does not ascribe to its own prerequisites, as it is neither a logical necessity, nor is it externally verifiable. TAKE THAT, LOSERS.
  • The weak verification principle also allows for some religious statements to be proven as true due to various other philosophical arguments, or the fact that the Bible can be taken as a form of historical proof.


The Falsification Principle


  • This is something piloted by a fella named Antony Flew.
  • He applied the Falsification Principle to religious statements and found them to be meaningless!
  • He argues this as it appears to be that religious statements allow nothing to count against them, and, without this crucial ability, they have no meaning.
  • For example, believers hold that “God is good”, regardless of what evidence is provided to the contrary. Believers usually always provide evidence to the contrary, those that qualify God’s goodness, and thus these constant qualifications render the statement useless.
  • He uses the “parable of the gardener” to illustrate this:
    • Once upon a time two explorers came upon a clearing in the jungle. In the clearing were growing many flowers and many weeds. One explorer says, ‘Some gardener must tend this plot.’ The other disagrees, ‘There is no gardener.’ So they pitch their tents and set a watch. No gardener is ever seen. ‘But perhaps he is an invisible gardener.’ So they set up a barbed-wire fenced. They electrify it. They patrol with bloodhounds. (For they remember how H. G. Wells’s The Invisible Man could be both smelt and touched though he could not be seen.) But no shrieks ever suggest that some intruder has received a shock. No movements of the wire ever betray an invisible climber. The bloodhounds never give cry. Yet still the believer is not convinced. ‘But there is a gardener, invisible, intangible, insensitive to electric shocks, a gardener who has no scent and makes no sound, a gardener who comes secretly to look after the garden which he loves.’ At last the Sceptic despairs, ‘but what remains of your original assertion? Just how does what you call an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener differ from an imaginary gardener or even from no gardener at all?’”
  • The man so relentless in his zeal allows nothing to disprove what he believes and thus, it has no meaning.


  • However, statements still have meaning regardless of whether we can falsify them. Richard Swinburne ponders on whether toys come out of a toy box when no one is around and comes to realise that we still understand the meaning of the statement, even if it cannot be falsified or verified.
  • Basil Mitchell points out that Flew appears to forget that believers have a “prior commitment to trust in God based on faith.” This is what allows little to come between them and God.
  • R.M. Hare believes that yes, falsification can be used to give meaning to cognitive statements, but not non-cognitive ones, like religious statements. Religious language can thusly never be made factual, but still possesses meaning. He uses the example of a worried student:
    • This student believes mafia Dons are coming to kill him and will believe nothing to the contrary, even if it is logically and empirically proven! He takes all measures to make sure his life is not prematurely ended by these fictitious Dons.
    • Hare argues that, despite the fact that these claims are not factual, they still have meaning to the student.

He calls this a “blik”, and it boils down to the idea that “a statement has meaning in totality if it has meaning to one person”.


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In other news: publishing blogs with Microsoft Word 2007 is a pain in the arse.

Friday, May 26, 2006

Last day evar.

As you might have guessed, today was my last day evar at school, which, in honesty, is a day of mixed emotions. I mean, yea I do feel sad; I might never see some of my closest friends again! But then, if they are so close, surely I will see them just about all the time. Anyone who is not a friend is obviously not worth knowing or they are a blatently obvious pile of onanistic rubbish.

I also got a few letters. Well, more of "a couple". That is to say, "literally two".

They were both very moving, and, in one particular case, extremely saddening. I am uncertain what to do about the latter, and am very unsure as to whether I should post anything concerning it.

As well as this, I went for a pub lunch with the whole of my physics class: all 3 of my teachers and all 5 of us students. I was given a book entitled "The Bluffers Guide to Philosophy", which, to say the least, is very amusing. I'm about five pages in and already have laughed out loud a few times, something incredibly rare in any book I read. My favourite part so far was a critique of Aristotle's capabilities as a biologist, for he thought:

"Snakes have no penis because they have no legs. They have no testicles because they are too long."

One of the greatest philosophers of all time was that man... Sigh.

Not to mention, I saw the new X-Men movie today, avec my compadres. It's a good movie in itself but don't go expecting it to stick to the story of the comics/TV series. Goodness me, Jean Grey is so very sexy at times T_T

In other news: got my RS coursework back (just a copy of what was sent away, and you can find it here if you fancy a brief delve into the world of philosophy as a language.

For those who comment (V., Eevee and Grace), thanks for your time, and sorry for not answering, but I just feel kind of weird commenting on my own blog, sorry! I may do in future though, if you really want to check back on what you've written.

That's enough. STOPNOW. Peace out.

Thursday, May 25, 2006

The last maths party ever

I have decided that I will keep these things shorter and more anecdotal. If it works for  CB then it can work for me too.

Last maths lesson ever, and thus: last maths party ever. Cake, frivolity and utter nonsense. Our teacher bought cake; very nice cake, but very dry cake.

Khyle said, rather cuttingly, that our teacher should have brought cream as well.

"Yea, or ice-cream", she replied.

"Ice-cream you say?" asked Jason. "I could go and buy some from Tescos right now. What flavour do you want?"

"I was thinking just plain vanilla, that'd work. Alright, off you go."

"Y'know what? I think Jason needs some company, I'm going too."

"Ok, I'll see you guys soon, don't take too long."

And with that, we left the maths classroom.

I decided it might be a fun idea to be chauffered around by Jason while I was lying in the boot, which was surprisingly roomy, but not ever-so compfy. I do not regret it, that is for sure, however, pillows are a must in these situations.

We proceeded to drive to a girls house, rather than Tescos (well, we went to Tescos first, the Wall's Soft Scoop was sitting in Jason's car, melting a bit), in order for Jason to retrieve a guitar in order to compose and write the lyrics for a song for our maths teacher that Jason had completely failed to do several nights previous. We were invited in, whereupon I stood in her kitchen and marvelled at what a lovely house she lived in, while Jason begged her for some stringy acoustic goodness.

Victory achieved, we left, whereby I got in the front of the car and smiled and laughed as we shut the doors, sealing all the sound in, and told Jason he ought to "bed/woo that young lady what did give us that guitar".

"No, it's ok, I've got a girlfriend already and she just happens to be the female equivalent of you, so everything is fine."

And thus we returned to maths, where i proceeded to teach my teacher Irish Snap and she proceeded to lose very badly and squeak and squeal every time she lost. She also gave us little origami skeletal octahedrals which means that it would usually be a solid , 8-sided shape, but in this case none of the faces were filled in, hence the "skeletal" part. She tells us that they can also be called "nolid", for "not solid".

She likes maths a lot, bless her. I'm gonna miss that crazy lady.

Sunday, May 21, 2006

Satisfaction

I am currently worried that I am growing too satisfied in my life. This is something that I never, ever wanted to achieve, for where then will be my drive to do anything? To work, to read or cook; where will be my will to create? Where will be my will to get up in the morning?

Ok, so I was never really capable of the latter, but the whole manic-depressant "woe is me" attitude added a much needed (and laughably pathetic) dash of pizzazz

Right now it's something I could really do without. Without this kind of willful drive, what want do I have to do well in anything? Y'know, there's A-levels in a month and all that, and without any kind of motivation then not only is there no point in me trying to do well, but satisfaction implies that I shouldn't even bother to show up. I may as well stay at home and sleep my life away.

But then, there are people who have said it is a bad thing to be disatisfied. Schopenhauer told us the will was infinite in its expanse, forever wanting and incapable of satisfaction, and that this was a sadly comic thing. But, it appears, this is how the world works. Look outside your window, turn on the TV and take a look at the rest of the planet. What are we driven by? Consumerism and disatisfaction. You're TV isn't a flatscreen, hi-def model with supplied 7.1 surround sound speakers? Well, you should go and earn more money and buy one, for you will be briefly satisfied. But then, when you get it, it doesn't feel as good as the want now, does it? So you change your focus of want.

Apparently, freedom from this is akin to ultimate knowledge and complete freedom. Consider that in this limited and confining world you are incapable of free will. At best you can pull of compatibilism (where you do have freedom of action, but the chances of you doing something you are incapable of or something out of character are pretty small), but never free will. Consider you are put in charge of infinite power and are capable of doing anything that you want, are you free now? No! You are still bound by your will! But what if you could escape your will? What if you were no longer bound by desire? You wouldn't be capable of doing anything that you want, you'd be capable of anything.

But what about Nietzsche? He tells us that the "Ultimate Man", the man who is complete in his capabilities and fulfilled, he is the worst kind of man to ever hope to become. The "Super Man", on the other hand was one of compassion and want and lust. He spoke thusly of the Super Man:

"Man is a rope stretched between the animal and the Superman- a rope over an abyss.
A dangerous crossing, a dangerous wayfaring, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous trembling and halting.

What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal: what is lovable in man is that he is an over-going and a down-going.

I love those that know not how to live except as down-goers, for they are the over-goers.
I love the great despisers, because they are the great adorers, and arrows of longing for the other shore.

I love those who do not first seek a reason beyond the stars for going down and being sacrifices, but sacrifice themselves to the earth, that the earth of the Superman may hereafter arrive.

I love him who liveth in order to know, and seeketh to know in order that the Superman may hereafter live. Thus seeketh he his own down-going.

I love him who laboureth and inventeth, that he may build the house for the Superman, and prepare for him earth, animal, and plant: for thus seeketh he his own down-going.

I love him who loveth his virtue: for virtue is the will to down-going, and an arrow of longing.
I love him who reserveth no share of spirit for himself, but wanteth to be wholly the spirit of his virtue: thus walketh he as spirit over the bridge.

I love him who maketh his virtue his inclination and destiny: thus, for the sake of his virtue, he is willing to live on, or live no more.

I love him who desireth not too many virtues. One virtue is more of a virtue than two, because it is more of a knot for one's destiny to cling to.

I love him whose soul is lavish, who wanteth no thanks and doth not give back: for he always bestoweth, and desireth not to keep for himself.

I love him who is ashamed when the dice fall in his favour, and who then asketh: "Am I a dishonest player?"- for he is willing to succumb.

I love him who scattereth golden words in advance of his deeds, and always doeth more than he promiseth: for he seeketh his own down-going.

I love him who justifieth the future ones, and redeemeth the past ones: for he is willing to succumb through the present ones.

I love him who chasteneth his God, because he loveth his God: for he must succumb through the wrath of his God.

I love him whose soul is deep even in the wounding, and may succumb through a small matter: thus goeth he willingly over the bridge.

I love him whose soul is so overfull that he forgetteth himself, and all things are in him: thus all things become his down-going.

I love him who is of a free spirit and a free heart: thus is his head only the bowels of his heart; his heart, however, causeth his down-going.

I love all who are like heavy drops falling one by one out of the dark cloud that lowereth over man: they herald the coming of the lightning, and succumb as heralds.

Lo, I am a herald of the lightning, and a heavy drop out of the cloud: the lightning, however, is the Superman."



And what of the Ultimate Man? He says, simply, "Weariness, which seeketh to get to the ultimate with one leap, with a death-leap; a poor ignorant weariness, unwilling even to will any longer..."


So... What is it that I'd rather be?

Sunday, May 14, 2006

The Blogosphere

I guess you can say this blog might be just for V., my first ever blogite friendling (or, more realistically, the only person that I don't know who has taken the time to read and comment and this piece-o-shit monologue of mine).

We've had a brief recourse on anonymity and things like that, and receiving a new comment from V. this morning I dwelled on it a little longer, which got me to thinking about the eneffably magnificent Mr. Schopenhauer, and a dialogue of his on the nature of existence, immortality and individuality. It goes, in short, like this:


Philalethes
: What awaits you on death? Everything and nothing! Your immanent self will end and your transcendental self will live

Thrasymachos: But what of my individuality? It is dear to me, and I shall not let it go.

Philalethes: When you say you wish to retain your individuality you really imply that you wish to exist, and that is what all immanent creatures feel! In admitting you wish to retain your individuality and thus exist, you are subverting yourself by assigning yourself to a non-individual idea.

Thrasymachos: ... You are childish yourself and extremely ridiculous, and so are all philosophers; and when a sedate man like myself lets himself in for a quarter of an hour’s talk with such fools, it is merely for the sake of amusement and to while away the time. I have more important matters to look to now; so, adieu!

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In other news:

Our May Ball ended in the wee hours of yesterday morning, and truly it was a blast. I won two awards (most respected and best dressed on the night; oh yes, who's sexy?), I got caught in the crossfire of the anciet debate of "which is better/more useful/more difficult: maths or physics?" and the same old adages came out: "well... physics is maths..." and so on and so on.

Aside from that, I saw my maths teacher take sambouca shots, he called me a "git" all night for "subverting the course of learning" and general chit-chat.

I met my female physics teachers boyfriend (who owns my shoes...) and saw her utterly hammered. I should have realised, she being a tiny little woman and not having much body mass and blood content as a result of that, it wouldn't take her much to get to that stage. I think I counted it as 2 glasses of wine before conversation flowed freely and general giggles abounded.

I also discovered most of the "jocks" of our year take cocaine! In the words of Phillip Fish: "all the cool kids are doing me!"

Half way through the awards ceremony, one of the most irksome, arrogant and seminally irritating of the bunch barged on stage, stole the microphone and proclaimed through his alcohol induced slurs and narcotic powered twitchings, "right, these awards are FUCKING WANK", at which point the DJ cut the mic and he had to be manhandled off stage.

There actually appear to be more tales of intrigue from that night but their finales were never acted out. I'll get the endings for you by monday if my cold abates.

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PS: V., I neeeeeeeeeeeeeeeed a link to your blog! (plz)

Saturday, May 06, 2006

Hopipolla



Thought you guys might like this (whoever "you guys are"), this is Sigur Ros' video for the fun, funky, puddle jumping hit "Hopipolla".

I just thought it was endearing.

Enjoi.

Wednesday, May 03, 2006

The Problem of Evil

The Problem of Evil

  • Distinction should initially be observed between the world of moral evil and the world of natural evil.
  • Moral evil is epitomised by mans injustice to man and can be said to be caused by various cruelties, ignorance or anything that may cause an adverse affect as a direct result of human action.
  • Natural evil is the “malfunctioning of the natural world” and is encompassed by natural disasters and things.
  • It is important to note that the main belief is that suffering in its widest scope (mental as well as physical anguish) is the main consequence of evil doing, and this suffering does not discriminate against who it affects.

The Problem of Evil

  • The “problem of evil” for believers is the confusion felt by knowing that an all loving, all powerful, omnipresent being knows about suffering and is capable of stopping it, but does not. It is often sited that, as a result of this, there is no God or that He is not a God worth worshipping.
  • This problem only really exists for believers in the “God of classical theism”, as believers in polytheism or more modern religions, or even Buddhism, do not need the idea of suffering to be dispelled. In polytheism, suffering arises as a result of Godly strife, in Gaian theology suffering on a global scale is only our own fault and Buddhism realises that “all life is suffering”.
  • So, here are the main problems:
  • If God is so powerful, a world creating God with complete omnipotence then surely it would be within his power to create a world free from suffering in the first place, or, if it did come about, he should be able to rectify the problem.
  • If God knows everything, he knows how to end suffering. If he was all loving too then surely he would want to end suffering? (This could, however, be likened unto a parent letting an infant touch something hot, so that they can learn on a personal level, but this is addressed later).
  • David Hume, bless him, recognises that only 2 of the three apparent things here really exist. God is not omnipotent, he is not omnibenevolent or there is no such thing as evil.
    Admittedly, some people have refuted evil in the past, Hume feels its effects are felt too widely to be dismissible. Seeing as Hume considered evil to be readily present in life, either God is “impotent or malicious” and either signals that the God of classical theism is non-existent.
  • Aquinas says the same!
  • “It seems that God does not exist: because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the name of God means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.”
  • Y’see, as Aquinas believed God’s infinite goodness to be an integral part of God, anything that can refute this will mean that God does not exist.
  • However, this did not sit well with Aquinas. He argued that when we talk about the “goodness” of God, we are actually referring to human goodness, something incomparable to Gods goodness, so, evil may exist as part of “God’s Plan”, and there are several theodicies which talk about it’s nature in this way.

Augustine’s Theodicy

  • God is perfect; he made a world without flaw.
  • He cannot be blamed for creating evil since is not a substance, but a lack thereof, and it would make no sense to say that God created a lack of something. Augustine used the example of sight in saying that blindness is the “privation of good” of sight.
  • Evil comes from angels and humans who turn away from God, as they are agents of free will, capable of doing this!
  • The chance of evil is necessary, as only God is perfect and insusceptible to change.
  • Everyone is guilty, as all were present within Adam.
  • Everyone deserves punishment.
  • Natural evil is a fine punishment because human action destroyed the original natural order. In a world where natural evil has destroyed the balance of Good, there is a chance for moral evil to flourish.
  • God is right not to intervene.
  • That God saves people through belief shows he is merciful and sufficiently just.
  • Brian Davies supports the idea the evil cannot be a substance, rather it is “a gap between what there is and what there ought to be”.
  • The argument from free will works too, as, in being given completely free will, it certainly necessitates a possibility for evil. Plantinga argues that if God had made us able to only choose good above all else then we would not have a real freedom of choice at all.
  • Augustine believes that free will is so valuable that it justifies the risk of evil.
  • However, it has been argued that Augustine’s argument contains:
  • Logical errors
  • Scientific errors and
  • Moral errors.
  • Scleiermacher argued there is a logical dilemma in considering that a perfect world can possibly go wrong, being illogical in itself, and also considering that evil has created itself which is impossible, or an attributed only to God. So, evil must be attributed to God.
  • As well as this, if a perfect world is created without knowledge of good or evil (as that is what a perfect world dictates that only good is known) then surely there is no capacity to disobey God. The fact that we are capable of this implies we must have known evil already, and thus it must have come from God.
  • Augustine’s ideas also contradict nearly all of known science. His reliance on the story of genesis belittles the whole of evolution and the selfishness which has caused man to flourish.
  • On scientific grounds, nor can we be held responsible for Adam’s sin, as it is biologically daft. So, there is no reason for God to cause us to suffer for Adam’s sin.
  • As well as this, Augustine seems to feel that Hell was a part of God’s universe, meaning he must have known that things would have gone wrong and already accepted it. Not to mention his choice in taking people to heaven seems largely inconsistent with a loving God.

Irenaus’ Theodicy

  • God’s aim was to create humans without flaw, truly, in His likeness.
  • Genuine perfection cannot be ready made, but must be cultivated through freedom of choice.
  • As we were given free choice, we were also, necessarily, given the opportunity to disobey him.
  • Without evil, there would be no potential. If we were already perfect and lived in a monitored garden then free will would be a thing of myth.
  • So, there has to be room for freedom and evil, and God has to stand back from creation to allow perfection to develop.
  • Because we disobey God, we cause suffering.
  • Eventually, everyone overcomes evil and lives in God’s likeness in Heaven.
  • His developmental argument stems from Genesis 1:26, “let us make man in our image, after our likeness”. First we are created into an image, a projection, if you will, and only later will we develop unto godliness. Evil, he claimed, was an essential part of the metamorphosis.
  • The biggest problem Irenaus had to face was answering the “why”s surrounding his ideas. His main claim was that development into something more godly involved the “willing cooperation of human individuals.” He says that this cooperation endows us also with genuine freedom, that freedom cannot be brought about by being forced into doing it.
  • He also, despite its horrors, says that evil is beneficial as it allows us to comprehend what is good.
  • He claims that in arguing that God should take away evil, God should take away our innate humanity, as divine intervention when evil threatens is no kind of freedom.
  • John Hick and peter Vardy like this! Vardy comes up with the analogy of a king wanting to marry a peasant girl. Sure, he can decree she marry him, but where would be the love in that? So, he offers her time to get to know him and develop a relationship and love would grow. Distance, from God, is thus a necessity! Hick called this the “epistemic distance”.
  • This makes other points, saying that man was created imperfect, far from God in a world less paradisiacal. A world where God watched us would be no free world, and a paradise would have no concept of right and wrong, good and evil, as all of our acts would be without consequence.
  • As well as this, heaven makes sense! As often, life is just horrible suffering and no attainment is achieved. In having an afterlife to develop in, things become far easier.
  • The fact that heaven is available for all seems very counterintuitive to the history of Christian argument, and seems rather unjust! All those who have done terrible things get a fine afterlife anyway! It calls God’s own sense of justice into serious question. Not only that, but it refutes moral behaviour! Without any afterlife judgement based on this, we can do as we please and get away, perhaps literally, with murder. Thus, we have no incentive to make the decisions that allow us closer to God that he originally wanted us to make in the first place. Surely God is incapable of such blunders?

Good Old Richard-ie Swinburne

  • Why does God allow the horror that was the holocaust? I’ll tell you why! Because doing so would compromise his gift of freedom! Knowing that God would intervene when things got really bad, governments may escalate small scale disaster just so God would come in and make things all better!
  • Death, despite being ‘orrible, is essential to free will. It means that the chances taken in life, and life itself, are limited. This is important as, only in a lifespan of limit can our actions truly have weight and responsibility.
  • Determinists could argue that this freedom does not exist though, and thus, it cannot ever justify suffering.
  • If God has predetermined the course of history then the holocaust would have been planned, but if we were truly free then God’s omnipotence and omniscience would be detracted from.

Process Theodicy

  • This accepts the view of Hume in saying evil is incompatible with the existence of God. It starts with the concept that god is not omnipotent! Crikey! Instead it says that he did not create the universe but is part of the set of an “uncreated universe which includes the deity”.
  • His role in creation was starting off the process of evolution. As we exert our own control on the world, we can ignore God. As a result, we have very little idea of God’s will, as we were not necessary created in his likeness.
  • As God is part of the world, he suffers when evils are committed, but is unable to intervene. He is the “fellow sufferer who understands”.
  • He does share some responsibility for it, as he started the process and knew he would be unable to control it after a certain point.
  • He took such a risk, it is thought, as the good produced in the universe is sufficient in amount and quality to outweigh the evil.
  • This whole idea denies the Classic God, and is thus not a theodicy at all, in truth!
  • The idea that life is not predetermined, with not heaven, no hell, no REAL God seems to disparage human effort!
  • The idea of good outweighing evil can probably never comfort those involved in the suffering, seeing as they will never be compensated in heaven.

Tuesday, May 02, 2006

Heavy Hearted

This one's for Jack.

Jack was a good friend of mine, and, at times in his life, has been my baby brother, my conjoined twin, my wise old uncle and my shuffling but adorable grandfather.

They story of his coming to my house were not especially exciting really. I was about 5 and I asked my dad if I could have a penguin to be told "sorry son, you can't have a penguin" to which I replied "... well, can I have a dog then?"

"I'm sure we can sort something out."

Jack was the runt of the litter and would have been put up for adoption or anaesthatised into oblivion had it not been for my asking for a dog. We were given him for nothing, receiving him as something barely bigger than a potato and loving him from the word go.

Over the past few years I haven't given him as much attention as I suppose I should have and it seems a bit late to say sorry, but I can't say that I'm not. I guess I just got into the habbit of thinking he'd be around forever. I was, very sadly, mistaken.

For a few months he's not really been himself, a little more slothenly I guess, but hey, he was a pretty old dog and it was something I was coming to accept. As of a few days ago he wasn't eating so well, he didn't want to go for walks and he had exceptional difficulty in getting up the stairs.

This morning I woke up to be told that he was really bad, so bad that my parents were calling the vet to schedule an appointment for having him put down.

I came downstairs to find him in his basket in a state of living rigor-mortis, his head back at an unnatural angle, his breathing shallow and tight and, if left alone for more than a few moments he would resort to quietly yelping until someone would come to him. I thought he might be doing it out of fear to start with, he's never liked being alone, but I realised after a while that there was something terminally wrong.

I was asked to stay with him while my dad ferried my sister to school. I sat on the floor, quietly weeping, stroking him for more my comfort than his, unsure of if he even realised I was there. He started yelping despite the fact I was trying to make myself as known as possible, my already free flowing tears increasing in the scope of their flow.

I started talking to him, knowing he probably wouldn't last until the vet's surgery opened, asking him to please just wait for my dad to come back, knowing my dad would probably appreciate being there when it happened. I realised that I shouldn't be so selfish, I told him that if he really had to go then he shouldn't let me or anyone else stop him.

And then he stopped breathing.

I kept stroking him for a while, thinking I was making it up, hoping he might start again soon. I know it was naive, but I refused to believe it. I broke down in earnest as I saw his head begin to loll and his tongue start to protude, and trecked to the bathroom for some toilet paper to cdry my eyes and blow my nose.

Coming back I realised I ought to do something a little more meaningful and grabbed a glass of apple juice, stood beside the bed where he lay and said simply, "Jack, you were a good dog and I'd be lying if I said I'm not going to miss you. I'm sorry that you had to go, but goodbye." And i stood there and drank to his poor, ancient little canine body and to anything left of him that might have a semblance of ears to hear.

Then he started to twitch.

His head pulled up and his jaws tighten as he opened, a faint gurgling coming from his throat as what was left of his breath was forced from his lungs. I then decided that there is no God, slammed my empty glass into the sink and, hands placed on the work top, wailed without remorse. I begged him to stop but he just wouldn't listen.

I watched for a while, waiting for it to stop. During this unholy ordeal his head had slipped from its pillow to rest hanging over the edge of his basket, and, thinking that I could not let him lie there so undignified, I raised his head back to the pillow only to watch it slip slowly down again. Again I tried and again he fell. Being unable to take it anymore; the death of my dog, my inability to do anything right, I just sat there on the floor and cried what there was left to cry out of me.

I waited with dread for my dad to come home. I didn't want to have to tell him the news, but I guess it was something I had to do. He came in and I apologised that he was a little late. His tears awakened mine anew and I realise now that I am not as emo as I thought I was. I get my ability to cry from my dad. There is something so passionate, so forceful about it and, despite the redened eyes and sniffly nose, something beautiful about it. I found myself hoping that there would be someone out there who would cry like that for me when I go.

I got myself cleaned up and headed off for school as my dad closed Jack's eyes and swaddled him in blankets and spare tea-towels. Yea, I went to school, in the state that I was on, only a pair of black sunglasses to seperate me from the rest of the world.

If anyone at school asked me why I was wearing them I told them. I didn't feel ashamed in telling them I'd being crying because my dog died, and no one else should ever feel any embaressment over it either.

And so, that's it I guess. School ended, I came here and started writing this.

So, in closing:

Rest in peace, friend; you may not have been the greatest penguin their ever was, but you were one hell of a good dog.